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Introduction
The quality of institutions and financial development are critical determinants of a country's investment climate. This is essentially because investment is a forward-looking adventure and entrepreneurs are for the most part, looking for a secured, stable (Aysan et al., 2008, p.2) , financially appealing (Asiedu et al., 2013) and less ambiguous (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab) environment in which to invest. There is a twofold interest in the above narrative. On the one hand, good institutions potentially mitigate economic uncertainties which promote efficiency and hence, positive investment decisions. On the other hand, a good financial environment offers more possibilities for private investment due to increasing financial allocation efficiency: the fundamental mission of financial intermediation in transforming mobilized deposits into credit for private investment. In the light of the above, good institutions and finance improve the climate of investment by enhancing efficiency and reducing the cost of doing business.
African countries have been characterized by a plethora of private investment unfriendly features, inter alia: low financial development and surplus liquidity issues (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014a) ; poor institutional quality (Fosu, 2013ab) ; high infrastructural deficits (Apkan et al., 2014) and substantial levels of capital flight (Asongu, 2014b; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2001 , 2003 , 2011 . This has led to a growing stream of studies in the African business literature on how to increase investment on the continent.
The studies range from: broad determinants of investment (Anyanwu, 2012) , to countryspecific solutions on private investment promotion as a viable alternative to multinational corporations (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Wamboye & Adekola, 2013) .
The experience of Zambia in attracting investment after failed privatization and liberalization policies has implications for other African countries (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004) . This has led to a growing body of literature on determinants of investment in Africa.
Consistent with Akpan et al. (2014) and Asongu and Nguena (2014) , documented factors that promote investment are multidimensional and complex. These include, inter alia: estimation methods, contexts of studies, data spans and measurement of variables (Hajzler, 2014; Moosa, 2002; Asiedu, 2002; Asiedu, 2006; Moosa & Cardak, 2006; Sekkat & VeganzonesVaroudakis, 2007; Buchanan et al., 2012; Ranjan & Agrawal, 2011) . Hence, to the best of our knowledge, factors promoting investment in Africa could be classified into two principal streams: business climate (infrastructure, trade openness, institutions, return…etc) and other factors (tenure security, weak land governance, regional factors, global economic shocks, resource-seeking…etc). We highlight them in the following two paragraphs.
With regard to the first stream on doing business, Amengdolagine et al. (2013) have used 1400 corporations in 19 nations of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to investigate the motives of backward investment nexuses to conclude that the main drivers include: time, local partners and market factors. Asiedu (2002) has documented infrastructural availability and return on capital as the main determinants in SSA. The roles of infrastructure, market size and trade openness (Büthe & Milner, 2008; Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Kinda, 2010; Bartels et al, 2009; Jadhav, 2012; Darley, 2012; Anyanwu, 2012; Bartels et al., 2014; Akpan et al., 2014) , incentive packages and labor costs (Tuomi, 2011; Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Bartels et al., 2014) have been documented as well. At the level of institutional quality, the following factors are important: democracy (Asiedu & Lien, 2011) , government effectiveness and regulatory quality (Jadhav & Katti, 2012) , general domestic institutional quality (Asongu, 2012; Neumayer & Spess, 2005; Gastanaga et al., 1998; Tuomi, 2011; Kinda, 2010; Bartels et al., 2014; Abdioglu et al., 2013; Cleeve, 2012) and low levels of political risk (Busse & Hefeker, 2007) .
While the above narratives sustain the need for positive signals like good institutional quality, the second stream which entails private investment in terms of foreign land acquisitions for the most part, suggests the contrary. For instances, among others: Areski et al.
(2013) do not find any significant nexus between the quality of business climate and investment; corruption does not significantly discourage investment in the BRICS and MINT countries 1 (Akpan et al., 2014) ; Chinese investments in Africa are motivated by weak institutions (Kosltad & Wiig, 2011; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013) and weak tenure laws in foreign land acquisitions (UN, 2010; Arezki et al., 2013; Economic Commission for Africa, 2004; Ingwe et al., 2010; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008; Wouterse et al., 2011; German et al., 2011; Thaler, 2013; Liu, 2013; Osabuohien, 2014) . Other motives include: resource-seeking interests (UN, 2010; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Jadhav & Katti, 2012; Jadhav, 2012; Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013; Rogmans & Ebbers, 2013; Lay & Nolte, 2014) ; global crises like financial and food shocks (Wouterse et al., 2011; UN, 2010; German et al., 2011; Clapp, 2013; Isakson, 2013; Fairbairn, 2013) and regional features (Asiedu, 2002; Anyanwu, 2012; Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013; Amendolagine et al., 2013; Yin & Vaschetto, 2011) .
This inquiry complements existing literature in at least two ways. First, it extends the Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014c) debate on: (i) the measurement of property rights institutions (PRI) and (ii) complementarities between institutions and finance in the promotion of private investment. While Asongu (2014c) has employed a composite institutional indicator instead of Polity IV as postulated by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) in the measurement of PRI, we still know very little about the types of institutions that are most favorable to investment 2 .
This paper addresses the concern by further decomposing the governance indicator used by Asongu (2014c) into its political (voice & accountability and political stability), economic (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) components. In essence, the paper's curiosity of assessing how different dimensions of governance promote private investment could have relevant policy implications.
Second, the study also contributes to the literature by investigating how structural constraints to African development could be addressed (unemployment, surplus liquidity, business unfriendly climate…etc). With growing evidence that rising unemployment on the continent would only be absorbed for the most part by public investment in the future (Asongu, 2013a) , it extends the stream of literature on promoting private investment (Anyanwu, 2006) by assessing the role of institutions versus finance. For the purpose, we employ all the four dimensions of financial intermediary development documented by the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank, namely: deposits (financial depth), credit (financial activity), efficiency (transformation of deposits into credit) and financial size.
We briefly discuss the motivation for considering several governance indicators in the light of recent institutional literature. Oluwatobi et al. (2015) have engaged six governance indicators when investigating the nexus between institutions and innovation in Africa to conclude that regulation quality and government effectiveness are the most relevant in enhancing the relationship. The effect of formal institutions on software piracy has been examined by Andrés and Asongu (2013) to establish that the control of corruption is the most effective governance weapon in the fight against software piracy. This is broadly consistent 2 "The Ali (2013, EB) (Asongu, 2014c (Asongu, , p. 1557 .
with Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2016) who have concluded on corruption-control being the most effective instrument in the fight against African conflicts and crimes. Andrés et al. (2015) have investigated the role of formal institutions on knowledge economy using the six governance indicators. In essence, there is a growing stream of literature on the relevance of bundling and unbundling governance for development outcomes, inter alia, in: (i) the prediction of the 2011 Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015a) ; (ii) asessing the role of lifelong learning (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016) and foreign aid (Asongu, 2015) on political governnce and (iii) examining determinants of foreign direct investment in fast growing developing economies (Asongu, 2016) .
The rest the study is organised as follows. The data and methodology are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical results while Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Data
The study assesses a panel of to have the opposite effect because it provides a negative outlook on the return to investment.
The variables which are defined in Appendix 1 are consistent with the studies motivating the inquiry. While the dependent and control variables are in line with Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014c) , the financial variables are consistent with the latter author. The composite PRI indicator of Asongu (2014c) is decomposed into its political, economic and institutional dimensions. The summary statistics and correlation analysis are presented in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively.
Methodology
Principal Component Analysis
Consistent with the underlying literature (Asongu, 2013b (Asongu, , 2014c , there is potentially a very high rate of correlation or substitution between the governance indicators. This leads to some information redundancy. Hence, we employ PCA to mitigate the dimensions of the composite indicator employed by Asongu (2014c) into its economic, political and institutional components. The PCA is a statistical approach that has been substantially employed in Applied Econometrics to reduce a large set of correlated indicators into smaller components of uncorrelated variables known as principal components (PCs). The first PC represents a substantial part of variation or information in the initial data set. We use the Jolliffe (2002) and Kaiser (1974) criterion to retain the PCs for various governance dimensions. These authors have recommended dropping factors with an eigenvalue of less than one.
In (Andrés & Asongu, 2013) .
On the relevance of PC-augmented regressors in terms of efficiency, consistency and inferential validity, we invite the interested reader to refer to Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015ab) who have confirmed such relevance after exploring a bulk of literature on the subject, inter alia: Urbain (2012, 2013ab) .
" Table 1 here"
Estimation Technique
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique is employed, consistent with Ali (2013) and Asongu (2014c) . The advantages of dynamic panel regressions have been substantially documented in the literature (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008; Asongu, 2013c) 3 . Two points are worth emphasizing for goodness of fit. On the one hand, the conditions for the use of GMM are satisfied: N>T (53>5). On the other hand, the use of threeyear data averages enables us to restrict overidentification or limit the proliferation of instruments. Hence, the number of instruments is consistently lower than the number of countries across specifications.
The dynamic panel equations are as follows:
Where: i represents the country and t stands for the period in years. Tau is three because we have used three year data averages. PI measures private investment; F , represents financial development dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity or size. Gov , denotes governance dynamics (political, economic or institutional); FGov, interaction between finance (F) and governance dynamics (Gov); I , inflation; E , economic prosperity; T , trade openness; t  is a time-specific constant; i  is a country-specific effect and;
Consistent with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) , the System GMM approach (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998 ) is preferred to the Difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) . A two-step estimation procedure is adopted instead of a one-step approach because it is heteroscedasticity consistent. The second order autocorrelation test in difference (AR(2)) and Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) tests are employed to ascertain the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals and validity of instruments respectively. It is also interesting to note that the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable are not contemporaneous because in the specifications, lagged levels of the independent variables are used as instruments in the difference equation (Eq. 2) and lagged differences of the independent indicators used as instruments in the level equation (Eq. 1). This enables the exploitation of orthogonal or parallel conditions between the lagged endogenous variable and the error term.
We briefly provide some discourse on marginal effects that is important for the sound interpretation of estimated coefficients. Brambor et al. (2006) have substantially documented the pitfalls associated with interactive regressions. According to the authors, for corresponding interaction estimates to have economic meaning, they should be interpreted as conditional marginal effects. This line of interpretation is consistent with recent African development literature based on interactive regressions (Batuo, 2015) .
Empirical results and discussion
Presentation of results
There are two principal concerns motivating this section, notably: (i) the independent effects of governance indicators and financial dynamics on private investment and (ii) the combined effects of governance and finance on the dependent variable. Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 assess the nexuses with financial depth, efficiency, activity and size respectively. The models are consistently valid across specifications and tables because the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests are overwhelmingly rejected 4 .
In Table 2 , the following findings could be established. First, while governance dynamics significantly promotes private investment, the effect of financial depth (deposits) is not significant. The incidence from governance indicators in increasing order is significant in the political, economic and institutional dimensions. Second, the interaction of governance and finance on the dependent variable is not significant. This may imply financial deposits dampen the positive effect of governance dynamics on private investment. Third, the significant control variables display expected signs. Accordingly, while high inflation has a negative effect on private investment because of an unfavorable investment climate, governance is endogenous to economic prosperity or growth in Africa (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014) .
" Table 2 here"
The results of financial efficiency (Table 3) , financial activity (Table 4 ) and financial size (Table 5) in terms of institution-, finance-, interaction-and 'control variable'-effects are broadly consistent with those of Table 2 .
" Tables 3-5 here"
Robustness checks
For robustness checks, we employ a Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) that uses forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences. The extension has the advantage of controlling for cross-sectional dependence and limiting instrument proliferation (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008) . The specification is twostep to account for heteroscedasticity because the one-step approach is homoscedasticityconsistent.
Consistent with Asongu and De Moor (2015) , four information criteria are used to examine the validity of estimated models. First, in order to ascertain the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test in difference (AR(2)) should not be rejected. Second, the null hypotheses corresponding to the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should also not be rejected for the validity of instruments. In essence, the Hansen (Sargan) test is robust (not robust) but weakened (not weakened) by instruments. Therefore, the modelling approach restricts over-identification and/or limits instrument proliferation by ensuring that in every specification the number of cross sections is higher than the corresponding number of instruments. Moreover, the Hansen OIR test is given preference compared to the Sargan OIR test because the former (latter) is based on heteroscedasticity (homoscedasticity). Third, the Fisher test is employed to assess the joint validity of estimated parameters. Fourth, the study also employs the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments to further examine the validity of the Hansen OIR test.
Two main findings are apparent in Tables 6-9 in relation to Tables 2-5 . First, the results provide support for the quality of governance as a better determinant of private investment than financial intermediary development. Second, the evidence of finance and governance as substitutes in their impact on investment implies that good governance fuels private investment and this positive impact is stronger in nations with less developed financial systems. While the first finding is consistent with those previously established, evidence of a decreasing marginal effect for substitution between governance and finance is now significant.
" Tables 6-9 here"
Discussion and policy implications
The results have shown that the interaction between finance and governance variables negatively affect private investment. The findings provide support for the quality of governance as a better determinant of private investment than financial intermediary development. This could be traceable to financial development inefficiencies that have been substantially documented in African financial institutions (Fouda, 2009; Saxagaard, 2006) .
These inefficiencies ultimately lead to surplus liquidity issues owing to information asymmetry (moral hazard and adverse selection).
Let us also discuss how the findings converge with or diverge from existing literature in two strands. First, on the former perspective, the findings are broadly consistent with Ahlin and Pang (2008) who have established a substitution effect: the positive impact of finance on growth decreases with the progress of institutions. Second, the absence of a substantial finance-led-investment nexus is broadly inconsistent with the bulk of existing literature on, inter alia: developing (Ndikumana, 2000 (Ndikumana, , 2005 Xu, 2000; Huang, 2006) ; Asian (Rousseau &Vuthipadadorn, 2005) ; European (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2008) and developed (Love and Zichinno, 2006) countries. To be more specific about sub-Saharan Africa, Misati and Nyamongo (2010) and Afangideh (2010) have also established a positive nexus. This difference can be elicited in the view that, the measure of financial development for the most part in the documented studies is 'money supply'. Hence, as established by Asongu (2014d), significant differences in the response of investment to finance are apparent when all dimensions of the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank are employed, notably, financial dynamics of: depth, efficiency, activity and size. In this paper, money supply is a component of financial depth.
Before suggesting policy recommendations in the fight against surplus liquidity, it is interesting to highlight how the financial variables employed in the study are: linked to each other and, related to surplus liquidity. Accordingly, financial allocation efficiency is the ability of financial intermediary institutions to transform mobilized deposits (financial depth or liquid liability) into credit (financial activity) for investment purposes. Hence, the second indicator for financial efficiency may also be measured as a ratio of the third (financial activity) to the first (financial depth or deposits). Hence, high levels of financial inefficiency imply higher financial depth or liquid liabilities and lower financial activity or credit. In what follows, we suggest policy measures for reducing financial deposits, increasing financial activity and hence, improving financial efficiency.
We now discuss some policy initiatives that might be used to address the concern of surplus liquidity. Consistent with Asongu (2014a) The above policy measures will offer greater possibilities for private investment because of increasing financial allocation efficiency. Hence, the fundamental financial intermediation mission of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for private investment.
Conclusion
The study extends the debate on finance versus institutions in the promotion of investment documented by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , Ali (2013) and . We assess the effects of various components of governance on private investment, notably: political, 
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